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Abstract— We present the challenges that arise when using 
redundant clock domains due to their time-skew.  Radiation data 
show that a singular clock domain provides an improved triple 
modular redundant (TMR) scheme over redundant clocks. 
 
Index Terms—Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), 
Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC), Single Event 
Upset (SEU), Xilinx, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR).  
I. INTRODUCTION 
In many circumstances, application specific integrated 
circuits (ASICs) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) 
devices require some level of mitigation to operate reliably in 
radiation environments. Triple modular redundancy (TMR) is 
the process of (1) triplicating circuitry into three redundant 
domains; and, (2) performing a majority vote on the redundant 
domains.  TMR has proven to be a reliable single event upset 
(SEU) mitigation strategy [1-6].  Subsequently, it is utilized in 
a significant number of missions targeted to operate in 
radiation environments. 
The state of a synchronous system is defined to be stored 
within the system’s sequential logic (DFFs).  When the state 
of the system is perturbed, i.e., the system is in an unexpected 
state, malfunction can occur.  In a radiation environment, 
ionizing particles can disrupt system-states by affecting: data-
path combinatorial logic (CL) (from a single event transient 
(SET)), data-path DFFs (from an SEU), configuration bits 
(from an SEU only affecting SRAM based FPGAs), or global 
routing logic. 
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In order to reduce circuit area and timing overhead, a 
designer can select from a variety of TMR schemes.  The 
TMR methodology is defined by which logic is triplicated and 
by which components have direct connections to voters. Each 
triplicate is referred to as a TMR domain.  The following are 
descriptions of three commonly used TMR schemes: 
• Local TMR (LTMR): Only flip-flops are triplicated. 
Voters are inserted and placed after the DFFs.  Clock 
domains are not triplicated. 
• Distributed TMR (DTMR): The entire data-path of the 
design is triplicated (CL and DFFs). Clock domains are 
not triplicated. 
• Global TMR (GTMR): The entire design is triplicated. 
Clock domains are triplicated (redundant).  
Theoretically, it would be optimal to implement TMR 
schemes with three separate clock-sources that create three 
separate clock domains.  Hence, if an SET were to affect one 
clock network, the other two would still be intact.  However, 
due to relative clock-source drift, using redundant clock-
sources to create redundant clock domains has proven to be an 
ineffective solution [7].  Alternate solutions include: (1) use of 
a single clock-source that connects to one and only one clock 
tree (one clock domain per source); or (2) use of a single 
clock-source that spans to three redundant clock-trees (three 
clock domains per).   
Regarding both TMR clocking solutions (mentioned 
above), the use of a single clock-source eliminates relative 
clock-source drift. Regarding the second solution, it is 
expected that using a single clock-source fanning out to 
redundant clock trees will strengthen mitigation. However, we 
show that this expectation is not always true. 
With older, slower devices, the use of single clock-source 
redundant clock trees has been successfully implemented.  
Alternatively, we show that with technological advancements 
in data-path routing and CL delays (Tcomb), the use of single 
clock-source spanning to redundant clock trees (although 
assumed to be synchronized) has become an ineffective TMR 
solution for complex modern designs.  The rationale is that 
race conditions are created due to unmanageable clock skew 
(Tskew) between the three redundant clock trees. In addition, 
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we show that some of these race conditions exist in small 
variable pockets and can be undetectable during the system 
verification process. 
We present the challenges that arise when using redundant 
clock trees due to their clock-skew.  Radiation data show that 
a singular clock tree provides an overall improved TMR 
methodology versus redundant clock trees.  Although this 
theory holds true for ASICs and FPGAs, for this study, an 
SRAM-based FPGA (Xilinx Kintex-7 FPGA (XC7K325T)) 
[8] was used to obtain heavy-ion data. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Clock Skew, Data-path Delay, and Synchronous Data 
Capture 
 
Fig. 1 Clock path clock tree. 
 
Fig. 2: Data-path with three launch-DFFs (DFFa, DFFb, DFFc) fanning into a 
capture-DFF (DFFx). 
In a synchronous design, there are two logic paths that are 
managed to achieve reliable data capture: a clock path (clock 
domain) as illustrated in Fig. 1; and a data-path as illustrated 
in Fig. 2. 
Clock paths start from a clock-source, propagate though a 
clock tree, and end at a DFF.  A clock tree, as depicted in Fig. 
1, is a network of routed buffers that have terminal 
connections to flip-flops (DFFs).  Regardless of clock tree 
source, i.e., single or separate sources, each clock tree in a 
synchronous design is considered a separate clock domain. In 
a synchronous design, it is mandatory to balance a clock tree 
domain so that all connected DFFs receive controlling clock 
edges at virtually the same moment in time [9-10].  The 
difference in time of a clock edge’s arrival to one DFF with 
respect to its arrival to another DFF is defined as clock skew 
(Tskew).  
In a synchronous data-path: (1) data is launched from a DFF 
in clock cycle N, (2) data is manipulated by combinatorial 
logic and routes, and (3) the result of the data manipulation is 
then captured by a DFF at clock cycle N+1. DFF data capture 
is controlled by a clock edge (from the balanced clock tree 
path) and requires data be stable during DFF setup (Tsetup) and 
DFF hold times (Thold). A marginal time Tmargin is defined to 
include additional constraints for the data-path 
accommodating voltage shifts, temperature effects, and clock 
jitter (Tjitter).  Tmargin is generally set at 5% to 10% of the clock 
period (Tclk).  Equation (1) describes the required relationship 
for reliable data capture in a synchronous system with 
negligible DFF clock-to-Q delay.  Equation (1) sets a limit on 
how slow a data-path can be and is referred to as max-path 
analysis. As a clarification, the delay of a single-cycle data-
path must be faster than one clock cycle. 
𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 > 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 + 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 +  𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 − 𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠          (1) 
Alternatively, data-paths cannot be too fast; otherwise, race 
conditions can violate Thold.  Equation (2) sets min-path 
analysis constraints. 
𝑇𝑇𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 < 𝑇𝑇𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐 − 𝑇𝑇ℎ𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑜 − 𝑇𝑇𝑗𝑗𝑚𝑚𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑚𝑚                          (2) 
Both (1) and (2) (max-path and min-path constraints) shall 
be satisfied for reliable data capture [9-10]. It is important to 
note that a system containing large Tskew will have trouble 
meeting min-path constraints.  In addition, changing the clock 
period (slowing down the clock or speeding up the clock) will 
not affect skew and, hence, will not fix the problem.  The 
absence of Tclk in (2) emphasizes this point.   
When using a single clock domain (clock tree), Tskew exists 
but is minimized by clock tree balancing.  Alternatively, when 
using redundant (yet separate) clock trees, Tskew is 
significantly increased. 
B. TMR and Clock Skew 
 
Fig. 3: Triplication of one data-path and formation of its mitigation window. 
Fig. 3 illustrates triplication of one data-path in a DTMR 
and GTMR design.  Voter insertion is also shown.  We define 
a data-path from a launch DFF-voter pair to a capture DFF-
voter pair as a mitigation window (MW). 
Each replication is a TMR domain. For DTMR, each TMR 
domain shares the same clock tree.  In GTMR, each TMR 
domain has a unique clock tree. 
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As previously stated, due to clock drift, only a single clock-
source should be used in a TMR scheme.  Subsequently, 
connecting a single clock-source to three separate clock trees 
creates redundant GTMR clock domains.  In this case, as long 
as there are no shared resources (after the single clock-source), 
SETs that occur in one clock tree should not affect another 
clock tree. 
In reality, the use of multiple clock trees in a redundant 
system increases skew.  In this case Tskew results from the 
following: routing differences from the clock-source to each 
clock tree, skew between the clock trees, and Tskew within one 
clock tree. The designer, to a certain extent, can minimize 
routing differences and internal clock tree Tskew.  When using 
redundant clock trees in an ASIC, skew between clock trees 
can be managed in smaller less complex designs; however, 
skew between clock trees is nearly impossible to manage for 
modern systems. In an FPGA, skew between clock trees is 
dependent on the manufacturer and is marginally manageable 
by the designer. 
With GTMR, in the absence of SEUs, there is a possibility 
of having broken MWs because of Tskew.  As an example, one 
TMR domain may have positive skew and is capturing one 
state ahead of the other TMR domains. The problem is that 
with the occurrence of an SEU, broken MWs have weakened 
mitigation (masking and correction cannot be guaranteed). It is 
important to note that, within a GTMR design, Tskew will vary 
between MWs and hence MW reliability will also vary.  
Consequently, pockets of broken MWs can exist, can change 
over voltage and temperature, and can be difficult to identify 
even with the usage of analysis tools. Alternatively with 
DTMR, if designed correctly, there are no broken MWs.   
C. Timing: Old Devices versus New Devices 
In older devices, Tcomb is large enough (i.e., logic is slow) to 
accommodate Tskew and min-path constraints (Eq (2)). With 
the advances in technology, Tcomb is becoming smaller due to 
faster routes and faster combinatorial logic cells.  Hence, min-
path Tskew constraints are becoming stricter with new 
technology.  For this reason, although redundant clock 
domains were successfully implemented in older technologies, 
this is not the case for newer technologies. 
III. HEAVY-ION TESTING AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Heavy-ion testing was performed at Texas A&M Cyclotron 
Institute.  All tests regarding data provided in this manuscript 
were performed at room temperature.  The following sections 
provide accelerated heavy-ion data and describe data analysis. 
A. Device under Test and Designs under Analysis 
The device under test (DUT) for this study is the Xilinx 
Kintex-7 FPGA (XC7K325T-1FBG900).  It is a high speed 
FPGA manufactured on a 28nm process. 
The designs under analysis (DUA), for this manuscript, are 
three versions of the NASA Electronics Parts and Packaging 
(NEPP) developed counter arrays [6].  For statistical purposes, 
each counter array contains 200 8-bit counters. The DUAs 
vary by TMR schemes as follows: (1) No-TMR reference 
design, (2) DTMR design, and (3) GTMR design.  LTMR was 
not implemented because it has been shown, in Xilinx non-
radiation-hardened FPGA devices, that the LTMR 
methodology will cause higher SEU susceptibility than 
designs that do not contain mitigation [11]. 
 
Fig. 4: Example of how a mitigation window is partitioned in the DUT. 
The DTMR and GTMR designs are partitioned in order to 
reduce shared resources.  This in turn can potentially reduce 
single points of system failure from SEUs.  Fig. 4 illustrates 
the logical partitioning of the DUAs within the DUT. 
The goal for this test-suite is to investigate the impact of 
Tskew to TMR’d designs within high-speed devices; i.e., 
devices that have fast (small) Tcomb. 
B. Heavy-Ion Data Metrics 
We use fluence-to-failure (particles/(cm2design)) as a 
metric for comparing mitigation strategies.  The formulation 
of the metric is as follows: for each test, the calculated 
effective fluence associated with the first observed failure is 
noted; at each linear energy transfer (LET MeVcm2/mg) 
value, the mean fluence to first failure (MFTF 
particles/(cm2design)) is calculated.  The MFTF for each of 
the DUAs is illustrated in Fig. 5.  As MFTF increases, the 
mitigation strength increases; i.e., a stronger mitigation 
strategy is able to withstand more particles. As a note, the 
average SEU cross-section (σSEU) per LET for each DUA is 
the inverse of MFTF. 
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C. Heavy-Ion Data Analysis 
 
Fig. 5: Heavy-ion data representing mean fluence to failure (MFTF) versus 
linear energy transfer (LET).  Data are for three versions of counter-array 
designs: (1) counter-array with no-TMR, (2) counter-array with GTMR, and 
(3) counter-array with DTMR. 
 
Fig. 6: Heavy-ion data representing configuration SEU cross-section (σSEU) 
versus linear energy transfer (LET). 
The following sections are analyses of the SEU MFTF data 
represented in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6.  The analyses are based off of 
the following notes: 
• It is not definitive that an SEU in a configuration bit 
will cause a system failure because not all 
configuration bits are used within a DUA [4-6].  If the 
configuration bit SEU causes a system failure, then the 
configuration bit will have to be corrected (scrubbed) 
prior to fixing the state of the system [6]. 
• If an SEU affects the data-path or global tree, e.g., a 
captured SET or SEU, then the system state can be 
corrected without configuration scrubbing. Hence a 
difference between an SEU in the data-path versus an 
SEU in configuration is that data-path SEUs can be 
corrected without scrubbing. 
• Both DTMR and GTMR schemes are partitioned; and 
are partitioned using the same methodology and 
spacing.  Hence, configuration bits that control 
circuitry in more than one of the redundant TMR 
domains are minimized. 
• There are roughly 3.3x107 configuration bits in the 
Kintex-7 XC7K325T [8]. 
• All MFTF tests were run up to a fluence of 1x106 
particles/cm2. 
• During testing a variety of no-TMR reference designs 
[6][11], global SEUs are first observed at 
1.8MeVcm2/mg.  However, the observed system 
failures were small perturbations. This suggests that 
SETs at low LETs mostly affect lower leaf clock tree 
buffers (buffers closer to individual DFFs).  This can be 
explained because, at low LET values, SETs are not 
strong enough to propagate from higher clock tree 
leaves (buffers) to the DFFs. As LET is increased, SET 
strength is increased and larger system perturbations 
occur. Hence, at higher LET values, SETs that occur at 
higher clock tree buffers can propagate and affect 
terminal leaf DFFs. 
• Due to the partitioning scheme, lower leaf clock tree 
SEUs will only affect DFFs that are physically near 
each other. 
1. Data Analysis LET=1.8MeV•cm2/mg 
At LET equal to 1.8MeVcm2/mg, as shown in Fig. 5, no 
SEU system failures were observed with DTMR counters up 
to a particle fluence of 1x106cm2/mg. GTMR MFTF is about a 
decade higher than No-TMR counters.  GTMR and DTMR 
have MWs.  However, GTMR has the possibility of having 
broken MWs because of Tskew. For no-TMR there are no MWs 
because nothing is mitigated.  
Regarding Fig. 6. and [11], there are very few configuration 
SEUs in this LET range.  We attribute the majority of system 
failures at an LET = 1.8MeVcm2/mg to SETs that occur in 
low leaf clock tree buffers.  Because no-TMR has no 
mitigation, clock SETs can affect the system.  Because of the 
implemented partitioning scheme and the fact that low leaf 
clock SETs will only affect DFFs physically near each other, 
DTMR is not perturbed. GTMR can only be affected by low 
leaf clock SETs if the design contains broken MWs.  Fig. 5 
shows GTMR is affected at an LET = 1.8MeVcm2/mg.  
Hence, it is assumed that due to Tskew, GTMR has broken 
MWs.  Because there is a decade of difference between 
GTMR and no-TMR MFTF, suggests that not every MW in 
the GTMR design is broken.  Hence the GTMR design 
contains pockets of broken MWs. 
2. Data Analysis at 2MeVcm2/mg <LET< 4MeVcm2/mg 
As shown in Fig. 5, at LET values between 2MeVcm2/mg 
and 4MeVcm2/mg, DTMR and GTMR MFTF are statistically 
equivalent. We attribute the system failures to be mostly due 
to SETs in the clock tree.  However due to the increase in 
LET, higher leaf clock tree buffers are affected.  
In a DTMR scheme, there is only one clock tree.  Higher 
leaf clock tree SETs can span across TMR domains and cause 
a DTMR system failure.  In a GTMR design, the clock trees 
are redundant.  However, as previously mentioned, if the 
GTMR implementation has broken MWs, a clock tree SET 
can cause system malfunction. 
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3. Data Analysis 4MeVcm2/mg <LET< 10MeVcm2/mg 
As shown in Fig. 5, at LET values greater than 
4MeVcm2/mg GTMR approaches No-TMR. Configuration 
bit SEUs are now significant.  This is because there are 
roughly 3.3x107 configuration bits with a σSEU of 
1.0x10-9cm2/bit (as shown in Fig. 6).  It is noted that each 
design only utilizes a percentage of the configuration bits. 
For DTMR, because of the partitioning scheme and the 
singular clock tree, there are no broken MWs and most 
configuration SEUs do not affect system operation. For this 
reason, the DTMR is only affected by higher leaf clock tree 
perturbations. 
4. Data Analysis LET> 10MeVcm2/mg 
As LET increases, the number of global route SETs 
increase. In addition, the SETs become stronger and can affect 
higher leaf clock buffers.  There also is the possibility of 
configuration multiple bit upsets (MBUs).  Due to both 
phenomena, the DTMR scheme starts to break down and 
approach No-TMR and GTMR. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Theoretically, GTMR should be the strongest TMR 
mitigation scheme.  For this reason, it has been suggested as 
the TMR strategy of choice for SRAM-based FPGAs.  
However, the uncontrollable clock skew between GTMR 
clock domains can cause race conditions that inevitably 
weaken GTMR mitigation.   For small (less complex) designs 
implemented in FPGAs that contain clock trees with minimal 
Tskew, GTMR can be realizable [2-6].  As device and design 
area increase, as with modern devices such as the Xilinx 
Kintex-7, GTMR clock skew also increases.  The increase in 
skew increases the potential for race conditions.  Some race 
conditions can be uncontrollable and unrecognizable by 
manufacturer-supplied design tools.  Consequently, Kintex-7 
GTMR versus DTMR heavy-ion data show that GTMR or 
XTMR is an ineffective and unreliable mitigation solution.  In 
conclusion, we suggest that DTMR is a more applicable TMR 
strategy for larger commercial SRAM-based FPGA devices. 
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